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INTRODUCTION

Before stepping down as President of the European Central Bank ("ECB")
in October 2011, Jean-Claude Trichet stated that "the dialectic between the
individual nation states and the community of nations" was "at the core of
the European project" and that it presented "some of Europe's most
fundamental challenges."' As the European Union ("EU") navigated through
the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis, 2 a number
of fundamental challenges became very visible. During the financial crisis,
the EU institutions addressed issues of reforming financial regulation at the
EU level, 3 while governments of the EU's Member States faced political

Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law, PO Box 248087, Coral Gables, FL, 33124,
cbradley@law.miami.edu; http://blenderlaw.umlaw.net/. I would like to thank Michael Froomkin,
Lucas Jenson, and Markus Wagner for assistance and comments on earlier versions of this
Article.

1 Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the Eur. Cent. Bank [ECB], Speech at Humboldt Univ.,
Berlin: Tomorrow and the Day After Tomorrow - A Vision for Europe (Oct. 24, 2011), available
at http://www.bis.org/review/r111025e.pdf.
See, e.g., Nicholas Dorn, Regulatory Sloth and Activism in the Effervescence of FinancialCrisis,
33 L. & POL'Y 428, 428 (2011) ("In 2010 it became clear that sovereign states, which had bailed
out the banking sector, were themselves becoming targets of a mixture of financial speculation
and genuine fears and uncertainties over their financial health.").
2

3 See, e.g., Commission Proposalfor European FinancialSupervision, at 3, COM (2009) 252 final
(May 27, 2009) (proposing the establishment of a European Systemic Risk Council and "a
European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) consisting of a robust network of national
financial supervisors working in tandem with new European Supervisory Authorities to
safeguard financial soundness at the level of individual financial firms and protect consumers of
financial services"); Proposalfor a Directive Amending Directive 94/19/EC on Deposit Guarantee
Schemes as Regards the Coverage Level and the Payout Delay, COM (2008) 661 final (Oct. 15,

2008).
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pressures to respond to failures of financial firms as domestic events.

4

Many

of those same governments participated in the Group of Twenty Finance

Ministers and Central Bank Governors ("G20") meetings and committed to
taking collective transnational action in response to the crisis.5 The sovereign
debt crisis called for collective action at the same time as it illuminated the
divergent interests of different euro area states and the distinction between
the members of the eurozone and the broader EU membership. 6 While many
commentators speculated about whether Greece would exit the euro, 7 and
whether the euro 8 or even the EU would collapse,9 the EU institutions

See, e.g., FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/
at
available
(2009)
(U.K.),
36
CRISIS
BANKING
pubs/other/turnerreview.pdf ("The crisis revealed fault lines in the global regulation and
supervision of some of these cross-border firms, which raise fundamental issues about the
appropriate future approach. The essence of the problem-as the Governor of the Bank of
England, Mervyn King has put it-is that global banking institutions are global in life, but
national in death."); cf. EU-US COAL. ON FIN. REGULATION, INTER-JURISDICTIONAL REGULATORY
RECOGNITION: FACILITATING RECOVERY AND STREAMLINING REGULATION 8 (June 2012) ("[T]he
absence of any effective global framework for addressing a global financial crisis meant that the
immediate legislative and regulatory responses to the crisis were resolutely national or, at best,
regional.").
5 The G20 is comprised of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India,
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the Republic of Korea,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the EU. France, Germany, Italy, and the
United Kingdom are all members of the EU. For an example of the G20's reaction to the financial
crisis see, e.g., Grp. of Twenty [G20], Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System (Apr. 2,
2009) [hereinafter G20 Declaration], available at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009ifi.html;
cf. Eric J. Pan, Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in Financial
Supervision: Beyond Transgovernmental Networks, 11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 243, 245 (2010) ("For
financial law scholars, the G20, both in its existence and in the types of actions it puts forward,
represents only a temporary solution to an on-going problem of regulation of international
financial markets and institutions.").
6 See, e.g., FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, FUTURE OF EUROPE DEPARTMENT, REVIEW OF

THE BALANCE OF COMPETENCES BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE EUROPEAN UNION,
2012, Cm. 8415, at 5 (U.K.) [hereinafter BALANCE OF COMPETENCES], available at
("The
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/publicationsleu-balance-of-competences-review.pdf
crisis in the Eurozone has intensified the debate in every country on the future of Europe and
there is no exception here. Now is the right time to take a critical and constructive look at
exactly which competences lie with the EU, which lie with the UK, and whether it works in our
national interest.").
See, e.g., Cinzia Alcidi et al., 'Grexit' Who Would Pay for It? (Ctr. Eur. Policy Studies, Policy
Brief No. 272, 2012), available at http://www.ceps.belbook/'grexit'-who-would-pay-it.

7

8 For a view that the European sovereign debt crisis should not be seen as a threat to the euro,
see Pascal Salin, There Is No "Euro Crisis," WALL ST. J., July 18, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303754904577530381082945926.html.
9 See, e.g., Martin Schulz, President of the Eur. Parliament, Speech to the Members of the Eur.
Comm'n (Apr. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Schulz Speech of April 25, 2012], transcript available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eulthe-presidentlen/press/press-release-speeches/speeches/sp2012/sp-2012-aprillspeeches-2012-april-2.html ("For the first time in the history of the European
Union, collapse of the EU has become a realistic scenario.").
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worked to hold the eurozone and the EU together.10 But tensions remain;11
for example, the Government of the United Kingdom insists that the
problems in the eurozone are matters for the eurozone to solve, rather than
for the broader EU.12 As the EU moves toward further integration to stabilize
the eurozone, it is not clear how the arrangements for financial supervision
within the eurozone and the EU will develop.13 While the crises in the EU
raise issues about the relationships between the Member States and about
the extent to which policy making is and should be centralized within the EU,
they also raise issues about the extent to which policy making, with respect
to finance and financial regulation, is a technocratic or democratic matter.
This Article describes the evolution of the financial and sovereign debt
crises and how the EU has responded to the crises. In examining the crises
and the EU's reactions, the Article argues that the crises clearly demonstrate
a tension in the EU between democratic accountability and bureaucratic
decision making. This is a tension that recurs in the EU in many policy fields,
10 See, e.g., Commission Proposal for Commission Work Programme 2012: Delivering European

Renewal, at 2, COM (2011) 777 final (Nov. 15, 2011) ("The European Union is confronted with
the challenge of a generation. An economic challenge, that affects families, businesses and
communities across Europe. But also a political challenge, to show that the European Union is
equal to the task. The European Union can and should make a real difference to how Europeans
face up to today's crisis.").

11Cf.

Nicole Scicluna, When Failure Isn't Failure: European Union ConstitutionalismAfter the
Lisbon Treaty, 50 J. COMMON. MKT. STUD. 441, 452 (2012) ("[T]he very projects that were meant
to unite European citizens and promote their common identity, such as the euro, are now
straining transnational solidarity and producing a rise in nationalist and protectionist
sentiments.").
See, e.g., BALANcE OF COMPETENCES, supra note 6, at 10 ("Looking ahead, the Government
will: . . . continue to encourage and support the steps needed to ensure stability and
strengthened governance in the Eurozone; . . . ensure that action to tackle the crisis in the
Eurozone protects the unity and integrity of the single market; . . . work for more effective
regulation of the financial sector which ensures financial stability and protects UK interests.").
12

13 See, e.g., Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union: Report by President of the Eur.
Council Herman Van Rompuy No. 120/12 of 26 June, 2012, at 3 [hereinafter Towards a Genuine
Economic and Monetary Union], available at http://www.consilium.europa.euluedocs/cms-data]
docs/pressdatalen/ec/131201.pdf ("The vision for the future of EMU governance laid out in this
report focuses on the euro area Member States as they are qualitatively distinct by virtue of
sharing a currency. Nevertheless, the process towards deeper economic and monetary union
should be characterised by openness and transparency and be in full compatibility with the
single market in all aspects."). Rather than endorsing the document as it stands, the European
Council invited
the President of the European Council . . . to develop, in close collaboration
with the President of the Commission, the President of the Eurogroup and
the President of the ECB, a specific and time-bound road map for the
achievement of a genuine Economic and Monetary Union, which will include
concrete proposals on preserving the unity and integrity of the Single Market
in financial services and which will take account of the Euro Area statement
and, inter alia, of the intention of the Commission to bring forward proposals
under Article 127.
Council Conclusions 76/12 of 28-29 June, 2012, at 3, available at http://www.consilium.
europa.eul uedocs/cms-dataldocs/pressdatalenlec/131388.pdf.
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not just in the context of financial regulation; but the financial and sovereign
debt crises have made the tension especially visible. The EU's system of
harmonizing and centralizing financial regulation has developed
incrementally over a long period of time, and the incompleteness of the EU's
harmonization of financial regulation arguably contributed to the severity of
the crises. 14 The sovereign debt crisis has led EU policymakers to try to act
quickly to complete harmonization of EU financial regulation and address
weaknesses in institutional arrangements for the eurozone, thereby
increasing confidence in European financial institutions and sovereign
debtors. However, the EU's institutional constraints slow down change; some
of the new rules and arrangements require treaty amendments, which are
slow to implement. Others will require lengthy negotiations and/or the
resolution of legal disputes. 15
The European sovereign debt crisis demonstrates the mutual dependence
of states and financial institutions. European states relied on banks as
investors in their debt, and when banks faced difficulties, they looked to
states to bail them out.5 6 The EU's implementation of international
harmonized standards of capital adequacy for banks played a role in the
development of this mutual dependence because EU rules allowed banks to
continue investing in sovereign debt without calculating the real risks
associated with their investment.17 The original Basel Accord on capital
adequacy encouraged banks to hold sovereign debt, and Basel II's changes to
capital adequacy requirements, intended to fine-tune risk weightings, relied
on sovereign ratings, which underestimated the risks of sovereign default of
European states.18 Under the Basel II standardized approach, banks'
holdings of AAA- and AA-rated sovereign debt could be zero risk weighted for
capital adequacy purposes.19 Thus, banks were not required to hold any

1

See, e.g., Niamh Moloney, EU FinancialMarket Regulation After the Global Financial Crisis:

"More Europe" or More Risks?, 47 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2010) ("At the core of the
EU crisis was a destructive imbalance in the regulatory and supervisory architecture.").
15 Some commentators have challenged the legal foundations of the EU's new financial
regulatory agencies. See, e.g., Elaine Fahey, Does the Emperor Have Financial Crisis Clothes?
Reflections on the Legal Basis of the European Banking Authority, 74 MOD. L. REV. 581, 582
(2011) ("[T]he use of Article 114 TFEU as the legal basis for the EBA raises many difficulties.").

Cf. Press Release, Eurogroup Statement on the Follow-up of the 29 June Euro Summit (July 9,
2012), available at http://www.consilium.europa.euluedocs/cms data/docs/pressdata/enlecofin/
131648.pdf (referring to "the vicious circle" between banks and sovereign states).
16

17See, e.g., Herv6 Hannoun, Deputy Gen. Manager, Bank for Int'l Settlements, Speech at the
Financial Stability Institute High-Level Meeting: Sovereign Risk in Bank Regulation and
transcript available at
2011),
We
Stand? (Oct. 26,
Do
Where
Supervision:
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp111026.pdf ("[Ilt is fair to say that we do not know precisely how
other jurisdictions treat sovereign risk. The EU directives have the merit of being transparent
and it may well be that elsewhere in the world a zero risk weight is also widely applied to
sovereign exposures in a more opaque, purely domestic, regulatory process.").
1s Id.

1oId. at 11 ("[T]he Basel II standardised approach allows a zero risk weight to be applied to AAA
and AA- rated sovereigns.").
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regulatory capital with respect to such investments. The EU will, in the
future, reflect sovereign risk in its capital adequacy rules; 20 but the past
failure to do so illustrates a defect in technocratic policy making, 21 one which
was costly for European citizens.
The European tensions revealed and exacerbated by the crises are
inherent in the EU system. The entity which is now the EU has developed
incrementally over time and involves a continuous process of negotiation and
renegotiation. The European sovereign debt crisis has encouraged the
European Commission to push for more harmonization of financial
regulation, for example, by proposing the use of legislative instruments that
limit the ability of the Member States to apply divergent rules.22 The
structure and roles of the EU's financial authorities have changed. The EU
now has a set of agencies that have regulatory powers with respect to
different aspects of financial regulation.23
At the beginning of the global financial crisis, the EU had a central bank,
the ECB, with responsibilities for monetary policy within the eurozone area
and holding a mandate to ensure price stability. 24 However, the ECB had
limited powers to coordinate economic and fiscal policies within the EU and
no powers to regulate banks. The system separated responsibilities for
managing monetary policy within the eurozone and responsibilities for

20

Id. at 15 ('To prevent underestimation of risk for sovereign debt held in the banking book, the

EBA set a floor on the sovereign risk parameters. . . . This . . . paves the way for a sound

implementation of Basel standards in the European Union, moving away from the zero risk
weight for sovereigns.").
Cf. Stijn Claessens et al., The Political Economy of Basel II: The Costs for Poor Countries, 31
WORLD ECON. 313, 314 (2008) (arguing that the Basel II capital adequacy regime was
"formulated in a relatively exclusionary and closed policy community consisting of regulators and
supervisors from the G10 leading industrial nations and their private sector interlocutors").
21

See, e.g., Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
PrudentialRequirements for Credit Institutions and Investment Firms, at 8, COM (2011) 452
final (July 20, 2011) ("Shaping prudential requirements in the form of a Regulation would ensure
that those requirements will be directly applicable to institutions. This would ensure a levelplaying field by preventing diverging national requirements as a result of the transposition of a
Directive. The proposed Regulation would clearly demonstrate that institutions follow the same
rules in all EU markets, which would also boost confidence in the stability of institutions across
the EU. A Regulation would also enable the EU to implement any future changes more quickly,
as amendments can apply almost immediately after adoption. That would enable the EU to meet
internationally agreed deadlines for implementation and follow significant market
developments.").
22

23 Council Regulation 1093/2010, Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European

Banking Authority), 2010 O.J. (L 331) 12 (EU); Council Regulation 1095/2010, Establishing a
European Advisory Authority (European Banking Authority), 2010 O.J. (L 331) 84 (EU); Council
Regulation 1094/2010, Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Authority), 2010 O.J. (L 331) 48 (EU).
See, e.g., HANSPETER K. SCHELLER, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK: HISTORY, ROLE AND
FUNCTIONS
12 (2d rev. ed. 2006),
available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdflother/
ecbhistoryrolefunctions2006en.pdf ("The ECB is also the embodiment of modern central banking:
the overriding objective of its monetary policy is price stability.").
24
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the ECB's importance

grew exponentially

financial regulation. However,

within months after the crises began to unravel. The ECB has been an
important actor in the EU's response to the dual crises. In terms of the
immediate response to the crises, the ECB plays a significant role in the EU's
new European Systemic Risk Board, and provides liquidity to banks through
the Long Term Refinancing Operation ("LTRO") program. 25 Now, the ECB is
to become a banking regulator.26 As a lender of last resort, the ECB needs to
have powers to regulate the institutions that may look to it for support. In
the future, banks-at least in the eurozone-may be European in life and in
death. This development raises a number of questions ranging from technical
issues about how the new system will work and whether the EU and

eurozone can agree on the details to more general questions about the
relationship between central banking and bank regulation and between bank
regulation and the regulation of other financial firms.

An important feature of the EU has always been that it is as much a
political as an economic union. Economic coordination was designed as an
instrument to prevent conflict as much as it was an end in itself.27 Monetary
integration was identified as part of the European project very early on, 28 and
the achievement of a single currency was seen as being important for political
purposes to increase integration in Europe. 29 But the single currency was not
bolstered by adequate controls over the fiscal policies of the eurozone Member
States. 30 Enforcement of compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact
See,
e.g.,
LTRO:
A
User's
Manual,
ZERO
http://www.zerohedge.com/contributedlltro-users-manual.
25

26 See,

HEDGE

(Feb.

13,

2012),

e.g., Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, supranote 13.

27 See

Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister, The Schuman Declaration, Meeting of the Eur.
Coal & Steel Cmty. (May 9, 1950), available at http://europa.eulabout-eulbasicinformation/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declarationlindex en.htm ("[T]here will be realised
simply and speedily that fusion of interest which is indispensable to the establishment of a
common economic system; it may be the leaven from which may grow a wider and deeper
community between countries long opposed to one another by sanguinary divisions.").
28 SCHELLER, supra note 24, at 15. Scheller identifies 1962 as the starting point for consideration

of monetary integration in Europe:
[Tihe most appropriate starting point would therefore seem to be the year
1962 . . . and a European Commission document known as the Marjolin
Memorandum. This memorandum initiated the first discussion on monetary
integration at the Community level and prompted the first, albeit very
limited, measures in the field of monetary cooperation.
Id.
29 See, e.g., David Marsh, FalteringAmbitions and Unrequited Hopes: The Battle for the Euro
Intensifies?, 49 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 45, 46 (2011).
3o See, e.g., LUDGER SCHUKNECHT ET AL., THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT: CRISIS AND REFORM
9 (2011), available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocpl29.pdf (noting that although the
Member States agreed on a Stability and Growth Pact as a component of the institutional
arrangements for the Euro, the "Tact'sAchilles heel was its weak enforcement provisions"); INT'L
MONETARY FUND [IMF], WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK APRIL 2012: GROWTH RESUMING, DANGERS
REMAIN, at 3 (Apr. 2012) [hereinafter IMF, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK], available at
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criteria was notoriously weak.3 1 As a result, Greece was able to manipulate
its financial data. 32 The International Monetary Fund ("IMF') has stated that
the EU needs to have more effective mechanisms in place to ensure that
members of the eurozone adopt responsible fiscal policies. 33 However,
managing the adoption of sound economic governance in a multi-level
regulatory environment is a complex matter, and politicians and central
bankers need to be conscious of how different audiences will receive their
statements. 34 As EU policymakers confront the issues of maintaining
economic and financial stability in a context that is as political as it is
technocratic, they face a situation which is more complex than that faced by
technocratic regulators coordinating their actions in networks such as the
Financial Stability Board ("FSB"). The EU's larger context has allowed it to
make more progress in harmonizing financial regulations than has been
achieved in the broader international context, but managing the political
aspects of harmonization is not simple. In developing new rules, whether in
treaties or legislative measures, the Member States and EU institutions must
consider the reactions of European citizens to the implications of the new
rules.36
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/pdf/text.pdf ("The Stability and Growth Pact
was devised to bring about fiscal discipline but failed to forestall bad fiscal policies.").
31 SCHUKNECHT ET AL., supra note 30, at 10 ("[The 2005 reform] introduced greater discretion,
leniency and political control into procedures. The strictness of the 3% limit and the time frame
for correcting excessive deficits were relaxed, while procedural deadlines were extended. The
greater complexity of the rules made monitoring by markets and the public more difficult.").
32 See, e.g., ORG. ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV. [OECD], OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: GREECE

2011, 4 (2011) [hereinafter OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: GREECE 2011], available at
http://www.oecd.org/eco/48462569.pdf ("The dire economic situation was magnified by lost
credibility as serious deficiencies in statistical monitoring of government accounts were
exposed."); see also Manos Matsaganis, The Welfare State and the Crisis: The Case of Greece, 21
J. EUR. Soc. POL'Y 501, 501 (2011) ("The revised figures stunned public opinion at home and
shocked markets abroad.").
3 See IMF, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 30, at 23 ("Over the medium term, many
difficult decisions will be required to remedy EMU design flaws that contributed to the crisis . .
. A strong mechanism that delivers responsible fiscal policies is urgently needed.").
3 See, e.g., Jorg Asmussen, Member of the Exec. Bd. of the ECB, Speech at the European
Communication Summit 2012, Building Trust in a World of Unknown Unknowns: Central Bank
Communication Between Markets and Politics in the Crisis (July 6, 2012), transcriptavailable at
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2012/html/spl20706.en.html ("In Spring 2010, Angela Merkel
addressed the German Bundestag to persuade lawmakers to approve the financial assistance
programme for Greece. She had to engage in a profoundly political discourse. She employed all
tools of rhetoric. And she justified her appeal by declaring that 'the future of the euro is at stake'.
This was legitimate. However, in financial markets across the globe, that very same message
popped up on traders' screens as a one-liner: 'Merkel questions survival of single currency.' If you
were a trader, what would you do? The rest is history. One and the same message is received
very differently by different audiences. But those audiences cannot be separated easily. 'Political'
communication and the processing of this information in nervous and fragile markets has been a
major factor that exacerbated and propagated the crisis.").
35 Cf. Tobias Theiler, Does the European Union Need to Become a Community?, 50 J. COMMON
MKT. STUD. 783, 795 (2012) ("Attempts to stabilize the EMU project by making its members still
more mutually dependent and the Union still more intrusive and redistributive risk continuously

16
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For many observers, the EU's response to the crises raises the recurrent
issue about the extent to which decision making in the EU is and should be a
democratic and transparent process that relies on the Community Method
rather than a process of negotiation between the governments of the Member
States at Summit Meetings. 36 This issue arises in the EU in a way that it
does not when the Basel Committee adopts new standards for capital
adequacy because, unlike the Basel Committee, the EU has the power to
make rules that are formally binding on the Member States and on EU
citizens, much as a domestic legislature does. Because of the crisis, European
citizens in a number of states have experienced austerity measures that they
may blame on the EU as much as on their own governments.
II.

THE

GLOBAL

FINANCIAL CRISIS AND SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS

In the summer of 2007, the financial markets noticed evidence of
problems in the asset-backed securities markets when funds, which had
invested in securities backed by U.S. subprime mortgages, froze
redemptions. 37 A problem that originated in one area of financial activity
spread as market participants lost confidence in their ability to value
financial assets.38 Financial institutions suffered losses and regulators
intervened to provide support. For example, the Federal Reserve Board
helped Bear Stearns merge with JPMorgan Chase in early 2008.39 Central
banks provided liquidity support to banks, 40 and states even acquired
ownership interests in assets of financial institutions or in the institutions

upping the ante with public support for such measures demanding the very commitments to and
trust in the currency's long-term viability the crisis has already helped undermine.").
36 See, e.g., Schulz Speech of April 25, 2012, supra note 9 ("In the past few months we have

witnessed a disturbing trend towards renationalisation and 'summitisation': the Heads of State
and Government are arrogating more and more decisions to themselves, debating and taking
decisions behind closed doors and in disregard of the Community method.").
7 See, e.g., BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, 78TH ANNUAL REPORT: 1 APRIL 2007-31 MARCH 2008,
3 (2008) ("The simmering turmoil in financial markets came to the boil on 9 August 2007. On
that day, a number of central banks felt compelled to take extraordinary measures in an attempt
to restore order in the interbank market. The disorder was triggered by a freeze on redemptions
from a small number of funds that had invested in structured finance products backed by US
subprime mortgages of recent vintage.").

8 See id. at 4 ("By early August, a combination of growing concerns about the valuations of
complex products, liquidity risk and counterparty risk had led to a host of other markets being
negatively affected. There was an effective collapse of the market for structured products based
on mortgages, a massive withdrawal of investors from the asset-backed commercial paper
market, and a sudden drying-up of interbank term money markets in the major currencies.").
39 Id. at 5.

40

See, e.g., id. at 9-10 ("The Federal Reserve felt the need to be especially flexible. It successfully
introduced a new facility to auction discount window credit, to address the stigma associated
with the traditional use of the discount window. Moreover, after the assisted takeover of Bear
Stearns, the Fed agreed to extend loans to primary dealers as part of its normal operations,
although these firms are not commercial banks and, indeed, are not even supervised by the
Federal Reserve System.").

Spring 2013]

GLOBAL FINANCIAL

CRISIS & EU SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS

17

themselves. For example, the U.K. nationalized Northern Rock,41 a bank that
found it was unable to fund its mortgage loans in the market. 42
Public support for financial institutions shifted the costs of financial
failures to taxpayers. 43 The costs of financial bailouts put pressure on the
public finances of many countries, which were already strained by other
policy decisionS44 and declines in tax revenues during the crisis.45 States
implemented austerity measures, either at their own initiative,46 or as a
condition of borrowing.4 7 Greece's debt burden became unsustainable, and it
sought financial assistance from the EU and the IMF. The "Troika" of the
Commission, ECB, and IMF imposed significant austerity measures on
Greece, 48 and an EU Task Force for Greece began operating in Athens to
Id. at 10; The Northern Rock plc Transfer Order, 2008, S.I. 2008/432, pt. 2 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksil2008/432/pdfs/uksi_20080432_en.pdf.

41

42 HOUSE OF COMMONS TREASURY COMMITTEE, THE RUN ON THE ROCK, FIFTH REPORT OF

SESSION, 2007-8, H.C. 56-I, at 3 (U.K.) ("The directors of Northern Rock were the principal
authors of the difficulties that the company has faced since August 2007. The directors pursued a
reckless business model which was excessively reliant on wholesale funding.").
See Commission Proposal for a Council Decision Addressed to Spain on Specific Measures to
Reinforce FinancialStability, at 4, COM (2012) 406 final (July 16, 2012) ("As of April 2012, the
total gross financial contribution by the Spanish State (excluding bond issuance guarantees)
amounted to about EUR 34 billion (3.2% of GDP). The capital support was provided via the Fund
for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB) endowed with a capital of EUR 15 billion, of which EUR
9 billion were already paid in. The State has also provided guarantees to bank senior bond issues
amounting to about EUR 86 billion (out of this total, about EUR 58 billion guarantees are
outstanding)."); see generally HM TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT AND AcCOUNTS, 2011-12, H.C. 46
(U.K.).
43

4 See, e.g., Douglas Sutherland et al., Fiscal Consolidation: How Much, How Fast and by What
Means?, OECD ECON. POL. PAPERS 1, at 11 (Apr. 2012) (noting that for a number of countries the
fiscal challenge arises from "future pension and health care spending pressures" as well as from
the financial crisis).
4s

See, e.g., id. at 8.

See, e.g., HM TREASURY, SPENDING REVIEW 2010, at 5, Cm. 7942 (U.K.) (2010) ("The Spending
Review sets out how the Coalition Government will carry out Britain's unavoidable deficit
reduction plan. This is an urgent priority to secure economic stability at a time of continuing
uncertainty in the global economy and put Britain's public services and welfare system on a
sustainable long term footing.").
46

47 See IMF,

IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 10/111, GREECE: REQUEST FOR STAND-BY ARRANGEMENT 8
(2010), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/crl0111.pdf (noting that Greece
would, among other measures, implement pension reform, health reform, and tax reform);
Council Recommendation to Greece of 16 February 2010 with a View to Ending the Inconsistency
with the Broad Guidelines of the Economic Policies in Greece and Removing the Risk of
Jeopardising the Proper Functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union, No. 190/2010 of 30
Mar. 2010, 1 1, 2010 O.J. (L 83) 67 (EU) ("Taking into account the institutional weaknesses of
the Greek public finances and economy at large, Greece should design and implement, starting
as soon as possible in 2010, a bold and comprehensive structural reforms package.").
48 Cf. OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: GREECE 2011, supra note 32, at 5 ("Greece needs to modernise
its economy by adopting structural reforms that move its public sector and labour and product
markets closer to international best practice. Waste of public resources must end; tax evasion
must be decisively attacked; public services need to improve and confidence needs to be restored
between the Greek citizens and their government; employment of youth, women and seniors
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"bolster the country's administrative capacity and provide technical
assistance."49 In return, Greece obtained financial support from the European
Financial Stability Facility.50 In addition, Ireland and Portugal also received
support from the European Financial Stability Facility. 51 In 2012, Spain
sought financial support from the EU to help sustain its financial
institutions. 52 These developments made visible distinctions between what
came to be described as the peripheral EU Member States that required
financial support and those Member States that would be providing the
support. 5 3
As the crises developed, the Member States and the EU itself faced
fundamental issues of social policy, management of economic policy, and
financial regulation. Pension reform became a policy issue for the EU, partly
because of demographic change, but also because of the financial problems in
the eurozone. 54 The implementation of austerity measures meant that
citizens tended to feel the cost of a bailout in terms of increased taxes and
reduced government spending.5 5 High unemployment levels contributed to
should increase; effort, efficiency and innovation of workers should be encouraged and
rewarded.").
, Agreement on a New Programme to Secure Greece's Future in the Eurozone, COUNCIL OF THE
EUR. UNION (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.consilium.europa.euhomepage/showfocus?lang
=en&focusID=80910.
5o See, e.g., European Financial Stability Facility, EFSF NEWSLErTER (Eur. Fin. Stability
Facility, Luxembourg, Lux.), June, 2012, available at http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/
201206-efsf-newsletter-nO5.pdf (noting financial support to Greece, and that "[tihe crisis
mechanism comes as a complement to the key elements for progress: the structural reforms and
fiscal consolidation on the national level and the measures on the European level such as the
fiscal compact, increased surveillance and pan-European supervisory bodies").
51 Id.
52 See, e.g., Proposalfor a Council Decision Addressed to Spain on Specific
Measures to Reinforce
FinancialStability, supra note 43, at 2 ("On 9 June, the Eurogroup was informed about Spanish
authorities' intention to apply for financial assistance to recapitalize its banking sector. The
Eurogroup stated that it was willing to respond favourably to such a request and committed to
granting Spain financial assistance, covering estimated capital requirements with an additional
safety margin, estimated as summing up to EUR 100 billion in total.").

See, e.g., Mark Hallerberg, Fiscal Federalism Reforms in the European Union and the Greek
Crisis, 12 EUR. UNION POL. 127, 128 (2011) ("The sovereign debt crisis in Greece in the spring of
2010 and, to a much lesser extent, in Ireland, Spain and Portugal seemed to change everything.
It put significant pressure on the euro and on the governance structures of the euro zone. It also
made clear the degree to which all countries in the euro zone are connected to one another.
Budget decisions in one of the smallest economies in the euro zone had implications for all
countries that have the euro.").
59

See, e.g., Commission White Paper on an Agenda for Adequate, Safe and Sustainable Pensions,
at 3, COM (2012) 55 final (Feb. 16, 2012) ("Together, longevity growth and the transition into
retirement of the baby-boomers will have far-reaching economic and budgetary consequences in
the EU, reducing the economic growth potential and exercising pressure on public finances ...
the success of retirement reforms in the Member States is a major determining factor for the
smooth functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union.").
54

5s See, e.g., JONATHAN CRIBB ET AL., INST. FOR FISCAL STUDIES, LIVING STANDARDS, POVERTY AND

INEQUALITY IN THE UK: 2012, at 2 (2012), available at http://www.ifs.org.uk/comms/comml24.pdf
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poverty. 56 However, unemployment levels vary between the EU's Member
States. In March 2012, Austria had the lowest unemployment rate at 4
percent, while Spain had the highest at 23.3 percent.57
Thus, although the responses to the financial crisis and the sovereign
debt crisis have involved discussions about complex financial transactions,
the regulation and management policies of firms, and the technical conditions
for financial support to financial institutions and the Member States, the
crises have also affected European citizens, who are often left forgotten in
this largely technical discussion. The EU's sovereign debt crisis is a major
threat to the stability of the financial markets,5 8 to the international
economy,5 9 to the EU itself,60 and to the citizens who live there.
The crisis throws into sharp relief and intensifies features of the
European Union that are perennial-though not always so critical.
Structurally, the EU combines intergovernmental and supranational
features. In the Council and the European Council, representatives of
national governments meet together to agree on policies,61 whereas other
("The fiscal tightening being implemented by the coalition government includes net tax rises and
cuts to benefits, which will put further downward pressure on household incomes. Considering
all these factors, recent forecasts by IFS researchers have suggested that median household
income will continue to fall in real terms until 2013-14, and still be lower in 2015-16 than it was
in 2002-03. If realised, this would represent the worst period for changes in median income since
at least the early 1960s, and probably much earlier."); cf. SUSAN HARKNESS ET AL., JOSEPH
ROWNTREE FOUND, POVERTY: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS, BEHAVIOURS AND CULTURE 3 (2012),
available at http://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/files/jrf/poverty-culture-behaviour-full.pdf
(noting a
hardening of public attitudes to people living in poverty).
56 See, e.g., EU Employment and Social Situation, Soc. EUR. Q. REV. (Eur. Comm., Brussels,
Belg.), Mar. 2012, at 5, available at http://ec.europa.eulsocial/BlobServlet?docld=7548&langld=en
(noting that the "youth unemployment rate has reached a historic high in several countries and
an unprecedented one of 22.4% in the EU in January 2012 (nearly 50% in Spain and Greece)").
Lower income groups suffered more from financial stress since the crisis than higher income
groups. Id. at 27.
57 Id. at 16.

58 See, e.g., ECB, FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW: DECEMBER 2010, at 9 (2010), http://www.ecb.int/

pub/pdflother/financialstabilityreview201l02en.pdf ("The main source of concern stems from the
interplay between sovereign debt problems and vulnerabilities in segments of the euro area
banking sector.").
59 See, e.g., Christine Lagarde, Managing Dir., IMF, Speech in Berlin, Global Challenges in 2012

(Jan. 23, 2012), transcriptavailable at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2012/012312.htm
("[T]his is a defining moment.... It is about saving the world from a downward economic spiral.
It is about avoiding a 1930s moment, in which inaction, insularity, and rigid ideology combine to
cause a collapse in global demand. The longer we wait, the worse it will get. The only solution is
to move forward together. Our collective economic future depends on it.").
6o See, e.g., Schulz Speech of April 25, 2012, supra note 9.
61 See, e.g., James P. Cross, Interventions and Negotiation in the Council of Ministers of the
European Union, 13 EUR. UNION POL. 47, 47-48 (2012) ("[Ilt is in the Council where citizens'
domestic-level government representatives can make national policy positions known and thus
influence the legislative process. Therefore, the relative influence that each member state can
exert on the legislative process within the Council is of fundamental importance to the
democratic legitimacy of the institution as a whole.").
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institutions of the EU have more of a supranational character. Citizens elect
members of the European Parliament to represent their interests directly as
part of the EU's legislative process, although disillusioned citizens may be
less inclined to participate in EU elections. 62 Under the Treaties, members of
the Commission and Judges on the Court of Justice and General Court are
required to act independently of the states that nominate them. Even the
Council has some supranational characteristics because it decides many
policies by majority vote, which binds Member States to decisions that they
may oppose. The EU's legislative process has developed over time so that the
European Parliament, a supranational body, shares legislative power with
the Council in most matters (i.e., the Community Method). However, at
difficult times, such as during the financial and sovereign debt crises, the
Member States have often chosen to meet in Summit Meetings to make
important decisions.6 3 The members of the European Parliament do not
participate in these Summit Meetings. Thus, the Member States have at
times responded to the crises in ways which have limited the ability of
European citizens' directly elected representatives to participate.
When Martin Schulz became President of the European Parliament in
early 2012, he recognized that European citizens were facing high levels of
unemployment and increased poverty.6 4 Furthermore, this led to a "crisis of
confidence in politics and its institutions" that was "also undermining faith in
the European integration process." 6 5 He noted that,
For months now the Union has been stumbling from one crisis
summit to another. Decisions which affect us all are being
taken by heads of government behind closed doors. To my
mind, this is a reversion to a form of European politics which
I thought had been consigned to the history books: it is
reminiscent of the era of the Congress of Vienna in the 19th
century, when Europe's leaders were ruthless in their defence

See, e.g., Daniel Stockemer, Citizens' Support for the European Union and Participationin
EuropeanParliamentElections, 13 EUR. UNION POL. 26, 42 (2012) ("[C]itizens' opinions about the
EU matter for their participation in EP elections.").
62

63 Cf. Scicluna, supra note 11, at 442 ("[T]he separation of the symbols and rhetoric of
constitutional patriotism from EU treaty reform coincides with, and reinforces, a trend away
from political and legal supranationalism.").
6 Martin Schulz, President of the Eur. Parliament, Inaugural Speech Following His Election as
President of the European Parliament (Jan. 17, 2012), transcript available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/the-president/en/press/press-release speeches/speeches/sp2012/sp-2012-january/speeches-2012-january-1.html ("As a result of the economic crisis, in many
countries poverty is on the increase and unemployment has reached disastrous levels among
young people in particular. They are now taking to Europe's streets to protest against an
economic system which allows a small minority to rake in the profits when times are good, and
forces society as a whole to bear the losses when times are bad; a system whose workings might
lead a dispassionate observer to conclude that anonymous ratings agencies in New York are
more powerful than democratically elected governments and parliaments.").
6

Id.
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of national interests and democratic scrutiny was simply
unheard of.66
Martin Schulz is not alone in suggesting that the crises have undermined
the Community Method and have led to intergovernmental agreements on
the one hand and independent action by Member States on the other.
members of the Commission, conversely, tell a different story, emphasizing
the importance of the Community Method in resolving the crises. 67
III.

RESPONSES TO THE CRISES

The EU's system of multilevel governance requires it to deal with
questions about how powers to regulate different activities should be
allocated between the EU institutions, the Member States, and sub-national
authorities. But crises impose stresses on governments, on regional
organizations like the EU, and on multilevel governance more generally.
National governments, the EU institutions, and international financial
institutions wished to act to maintain confidence in the international
financial markets during the financial crisis and again during the EU's
sovereign debt crisis. The EU and its Member States faced calls to cooperate
with other jurisdictions and international financial institutions. 68 In both
crises, domestic politics led the EU's Member States to focus on the domestic
aspects of the crises and domestic solutions while treaty obligations and the
G20 urged them to focus on cooperation with each other. The G20 called for
international cooperation with respect to financial stability. It also called for
prudential regulation and new harmonized standards on hedge funds and
credit rating agencies and committed itself to "implement international
financial standards (including the twelve key International Standards and
Codes)."6 9 The G20, although formed in 1999 to address issues of financial
stability, is newly prominent as an actor in transnational financial
regulation. The EU is part of the G20, and as the G20's work on financial
stability (involving the FSB and the IMF) evolves, the EU is becoming more
of a layer within a more complex multilevel system of financial regulation.
6

Id.

67 See, e.g., Marog Sefdovi6, Vice-President, Eur. Comm'n Responsible for Interinstitutional

Relations and Admin., Speech at the Institute of International and European Affairs: The
Strength of the Community Method in Tackling the Crisis and the Role of the Lisbon Treaty
(Feb. 17, 2012) ("I think it's fair to say that the fundamental lesson of the crisis is that of
interdependence: now more than ever, we need greater integration to ensure that national
economic and budgetary policies cannot again have such a devastating effect on the euro area
and by extension the EU as a whole.").
See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM ON ENHANCING
MARKET
AND
INSTITUTIONAL
RESILIENCE
2
(2008),
available
at
6

www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r 0804.pdf ("While national authorities may
continue to consider short-term policy responses should conditions warrant it, to restore
confidence in the soundness of markets and institutions, it is essential that we take steps now to
enhance the resilience of the global system.").
69 See,

e.g., G20 Declaration, supra note 5.
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While the G20 has reacted to the global financial crisis by emphasizing the
need for increased harmonization of standards for financial regulation at the
international level, EU institutions have reacted to the crises by increasing
EU level regulation of financial firms, financial markets, and the economic
policies of the Member States.
Although at the beginning of the financial crisis the EU had a
harmonized system of financial regulation in which banks and securities and
insurance firms licensed in one state in the eurozone could carry on business
throughout the EU based on their home state authorization, 70 harmonization
of financial regulation was not complete.71 Structurally, the EU's system of
financial regulation relied on the sharing of competences between the
Member States and EU institutions. The Lamfalussy Report, which set in
motion dramatic changes to the EU's financial services regime, 72
recommended that EU securities regulation should comprise a system of
framework rules, detailed implementation of rules and cooperation between
regulators with respect to implementation of the EU rules and enforcement
by the Commission.7 3 The EU established a European Securities Committee
composed of representatives of the Member States to advise the Commission
on the policy issues and draft legislative proposals 74 and a Committee of
75
European Securities Regulators ("CESR") composed of national regulators.
70 See, e.g., Caroline Bradley, Consumers of FinancialServices and Multi-level Regulation in the
European Union, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 701, 706 (2008) ("Mutual recognition on the basis of
minimum harmonized standards was designed to achieve a situation where a financial firm
established in one Member State (its home State) would be allowed to supply services in other
Member States and even establish offices in other Member States on the basis of its home State
authorization to carry on business subject to home State rules.").
71 InitialReport

of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internalmarket/securities/
9,
2000),
2
(Nov.
at
docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/initial-report-wise-men en.pdf ("An efficient European regulatory
process for financial services and capital markets is crucial for the whole of the European Union
and all its citizens. Crucial for successful economic reform, for boosting European economic
growth. Crucial for helping channel the high rate of European savings towards the corporate
sector. Crucial for strengthening both the international competitiveness of the European Union
in the global economy and for releasing its entrepreneurial potential. Crucial also for job creation
and consumer protection. There are major strategic, economic and social benefits to reap from an
integrated European capital market.").
See, e.g., Niamh Moloney, The Lamfalussy Legislative Model: A New Era for the EC Securities
and Investment Services Regime, 52 INTL & COMP. L.Q. 509, 509 (2003) ("[S]weeping changes
have been made to the way in which EC securities and investment services measures are
adopted.").
72

Final Report of The Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets,
http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/securities/docs/
at
available
(2001),
19
at
lamfalussy/wisemen/final-report-wise-men en.pdf.
7

Commission Decision 2001/528, l 6, 2001 0.J. (L 199) 45 (EC) ("The role of the Committee
shall be to advise the Commission on policy issues as well as on draft legislative proposals the
Commission might adopt in the field of securities."). This decision was subsequently amended to
cover UCITs. Commission Decision 2004/8, 1 4, 2004 O.J. (L 3) 33 (EC).
14

75 Commission Decision 2001/527, art. 2, 2001 0.J. (L 191) 43 (EC) ("The role of the Committee
shall be to advise the Commission, either at the Commission's request, within a time limit which
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The EU subsequently established other committees for banking76 and
insurance and occupational pensions. 77 CESR, the Committee of European
Banking Supervisors ("CEBS"), and the Committee of European Insurance
and Occupational Pensions Supervisors ("CEIOPS") were transformed during
the financial crisis into EU-level authorities with enhanced powers.78 CESR
became the European Securities and Markets Authority ("ESMA");79 CEBS
became the European Banking Authority ("EBA");80 and CEIOPS became the
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority.8 1 The EU has
been centralizing regulatory supervision in some areas through these
agencies. For example, the EBA has carried out stress tests "to assess the
resilience of the banks involved in the exercise against an adverse but
plausible scenario." 82 ESMA has responsibility for registering and
supervising credit rating agencies under the EU's credit rating agency
regulation. 83 But this regulatory centralization has not gone unchallenged:

the Commission may lay down according to the urgency of the matter, or on the Committee's own
initiative, in particular for the preparation of draft implementing measures in the field of
securities."). This decision was subsequently amended to cover UCITs. Commission Decision
2004/7, 2004 O.J. (L 3) 32 (EC).
76 Commission Decision 2004/10, 2004 O.J. (L 3) 36 (EC); Commission Decision 2004/5, 2004 O.J.

(L 3) 28 (EC).
77Commission Decision 2004/9, 2004 O.J. (L 3) 34 (EC); Commission Decision 2004/5, 2004 O.J.
(L 3) 30 (EC).
78 Cf. THE DE LAROSIERE GROUP, THE HIGH-LEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE EU

(2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/finances/docs/delarosiere-report-en.pdf
(proposing reforms).
79 See Council Regulation 1095/2010, supra note 23; ESMA in Short, EUR. SEC. & MKTS. AUTH.,
http://www.esma.europa.eu/page/esma-short (last visited Mar. 16, 2013).
See Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 23; About Us, EUR. BANKING AUTH.,
http://www.eba.europa.eulAboutus.aspx (last visited Mar. 16, 2013).

80

8i See Council Regulation 1094/2010, supra note 23; About EIOPA, EUR. INS. & OCCUPATIONAL
PENSIONS AUTH., https://eiopa.europa.eulabout-eiopalindex.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
82 Press Release, Eur. Banking Auth., Results of the 2011 EU-Wide Stress Test (July 15, 2011),
available at http://stress-test.eba.europa.eu/pdfl201 1+EU-wide+stress+test+results+-+press+
release+-+FINAL.pdf. The stress tests did not succeed in enhancing confidence in EU banks as
much as the EBA had hoped. See EUR. BANKING AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2011) [hereinafter
EBA ANNUAL REPORT 2011], available at http://www.eba.europa.eulcebs/media/Publications/
Other%2OPublications/Annual%20report/EBA2012_online_final2.pdf ("A key component of the
Risk Analysis activities in 2011 was the EU-wide stress test exercise which was performed on a
sample of 91 banks using a single adverse scenario and consistent methodology. This exercise
has proven to be a very strong incentive for the banks involved as they took considerable actions
to avoid falling below the benchmark of 5% CT1 and raised some EUR 50 bn in fresh capital in
the first four months of 2011 in anticipation of meeting the commonly agreed capital threshold.
Despite its success also in terms of great disclosure and quality assurance, the main objective of
restoring confidence in the European banking sector was not achieved, as the sovereign debt
crisis extended to more countries.").
83 See Council Regulation 513/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 145) 30 (EU) (noting that the Regulation makes
ESMA "exclusively responsible for the registration and supervision of credit rating agencies in
the Union"). For the original regulation, see Council Regulation 1060/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 302) 1
(EC).
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the U.K. has questioned the validity of the EU's delegation of authority to
ESMA with respect to short selling and credit default swaps.84
When the crisis hit, there were differences in the content of rules of
financial regulation in different Member States: for example, deposit
guarantees varied from one state to another.85 And the EU had not agreed on
harmonized rules for rescuing financial institutions in distress86 or on
addressing volatility caused by short selling.8 7 The Commission has proposed
new rules in a number of different areas to address perceived weaknesses in
EU financial regulation.88

8 See, e.g., SHEARMAN AND STERLING LLP, SELLING THEMSELVES SHORT: EU ENACTS
REGULATION BANNING NAKED SHORT SALES AND SOVEREIGN DEBT CDS 6 (2012), available at
http://www.shearman.com/Selling-Themselves-Short-EU-Enacts-Regulation-Banning-NakedShort-Sales-and-Sovereign-Debt-CDS-05-01-2012/; Council Regulation 236/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 86)
1 (EU).

85See,

e.g., Proposalfor a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending
Directive 94/19/EC on Deposit Guarantee Schemes as Regards the Coverage Level and the
Payout Delay, 1 5.2, COM (2008) 661 final (Oct. 15, 2008) ("The current Directive allows an
optional co-insurance of up to 10%, i.e. a certain percentage of losses that is borne by the
depositor. This has proven counterproductive for the confidence of depositors and may have
exacerbated the problems. The argument of moral hazard (depositors should be 'punished' if they
deposit their funds at a bank offering high interest rates but incurring high risks) is not tenable
since retail depositors cannot, in general, judge the financial soundness of their bank.
Consequently, this option should be discontinued."); cf Sebastian Schich, Financial Crisis:
Deposit Insurance and Related Financial Safety Net Aspects, 95 OECD J.: FIN. MKT. TRENDS
(2008).

86

See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee, the European Court of Justice, and the European
CentralBank, An EU Frameworkfor Cross-BorderCrisis Management in the FinancialSector, at
2, COM (2009) 561 final (Oct. 20, 2009) ("The recent crisis has exposed the EU's lack of an
effective crisis management for cross-border financial institutions. In autumn 2008, Member
States agreed to take the necessary action to recapitalise and guarantee banks, and this
unprecedented action was coordinated at European level on an ad-hoc basis. The measures were
necessary in the exceptional conditions that afflicted the financial system.").
87Council Regulation 236/2012, supra note 84, at 1 ("At the height of the financial crisis in
September 2008, competent authorities in several Member States and supervisory authorities in
third countries such as the United States of America and Japan adopted emergency measures to
restrict or ban short selling in some or all securities. They acted due to concerns that at a time of
considerable financial instability, short selling could aggravate the downward spiral in the prices
of shares, notably in financial institutions, in a way which could ultimately threaten their
viability and create systemic risks. The measures adopted by Member States were divergent as
the Union lacks a specific common regulatory framework for dealing with short selling issues.").
88 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the

European Economic and Social Committee, and the European Central Bank, Regulating
Financial Services for Sustainable Growth, at 2, COM (2010) 301 final (June 2, 2010) (noting
that "the Commission has been working to complete a comprehensive financial reform to address
short-termism, poor risk management and a lack of responsibility of certain actors in the
financial sector and to correct the underlying weaknesses in the supervisory and regulatory
framework" and that progress had been made but that the Commission would "present the vast
majority of the remaining regulatory reform proposals to the Council and European Parliament
by the end of the year").
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The Commission adapted the EU's state aid rules (which are meant to
prevent the Member States interfering with competition by subsidizing local
industries) to allow the Member States to rescue failing, and even
fundamentally sound, financial institutions promptly while not undermining
the state aid rules.89 Although the Commission adopted its guidelines to
allow the Member States to act to rescue financial institutions quickly, the
need for rescues of financial institutions persisted into 2012.90 The
Commission worked on developing an EU crisis management framework for
banks91 and published a proposed Directive in June 2012.92
The EU's response to the global financial crisis intensified EU level
financial regulation by shifting some supervisory powers from national to EU
authorities and developing increasingly demanding rules of financial
regulation. Although intensifying financial regulation was designed in part to
promote confidence in EU financial institutions, 93 rescues were necessary,
and the EU loosened the competition law constraints which might have
impeded the Member States' ability to rescue their own troubled financial
institutions. However, the cost of rescuing troubled financial firms helped to
put pressure on strained public finances and led to the sovereign debt crisis. 9 4
Of course, the sovereign debt crisis also grew out of a system of monetary

89 See Communication from the Commission on the Application of State Aid Rules to Measures
Taken in Relation to FinancialInstitutions in the Context of the Current Global Financial Crisis,
COM (2008) 6045 final (Oct. 13, 2008). The Commission acknowledged that it would be necessary
to act quickly to protect the financial markets. Id. at 9 ("In applying these criteria to measures
taken by Member States, the Commission will proceed with the swiftness that is necessary to
ensure legal certainty and to restore confidence in financial markets."). See also Michael
Reynolds et al., EU Competition Policy in the Financial Crisis: Extraordinary Measures, 33
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1670, 1689 (2011) ("The Commission has attempted to find a middle way
between states clamoring for the power to rescue their most important financial institutions and
legal purists decrying an apparent chasm between the existing state aid rules and the practice of
the Commission.").
90 Communication from the Commission on the Application, from 1 January 2012, of State Aid
Rules to Support Measures in Favour of Banks in the Context of the FinancialCrisis, 3, COM
(2011) 8744 final (Dec. 1, 2011) ("The exacerbation of tensions in sovereign debt markets that has
taken place in 2011 has put the banking sector in the Union under increasing pressure,
particularly in terms of access to term funding markets. The 'banking package' agreed by the
Heads of State or Government at their meeting of 26 October 2011 aims to restore confidence in
the banking sector . . . . Despite those measures, the Commission considers that the
requirements for State aid to be approved pursuant to Article 107(3)(b) will continue to be
fulfilled beyond the end of 2011.").

91 See, e.g., COM (2009) 561 final, supra note 86; Communication from the Commission to the
EuropeanParliament,the Council, the EuropeanEconomic and Social Committee, the Committee
of the Regions, and the EuropeanCentral Bank, An EU Framework for Crisis Management in the
FinancialSector, COM (2010) 579 final (Oct. 20, 2010).
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a
Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms, COM
(2012) 280 final (June 6, 2012).
92

93 Cf. EBA ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supranote 82.
94

See, e.g., Dorn, supra note 2.
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union that imposed inadequate controls on the states participating in it
because it was conceived of as a political, rather than an economic, project.95
Some eurozone states had weak public finances even before the financial
crisis. 9 6 But the sovereign debt crisis and the financial crisis reinforce each
other because banks hold the sovereign debt of EU Member States9 7 and have
participated in credit default swaps with respect to sovereign debt.98 EU
bank regulation allowed sovereign risk to infect banks because the rules
allowed banks to invest in sovereign debt in reliance on sovereign credit
ratings without making their own independent assessments of the risks
associated with those investments.99 And the concerns about the reliability of
credit ratings, which led to new EU rules on credit rating agencies, 00 were
not initially generalized to sovereign ratings. Political imperatives to rescue
failing financial institutions allowed the banks to infect sovereign debt,
making it harder for sovereigns to borrow. Strategies adopted to resolve the
crisis created new risks. For example, Greece's retroactive introduction of
collective action clauses into Greek law-governed debt-allowing a
restructuring to be imposed on dissenting creditors-was seen as having
implications for the ability of other eurozone sovereigns to borrow.101 The
International Swaps and Derivatives Association announced that Greece's
exercise of collective action clauses constituted a Restructuring Credit Event
for the purposes of credit default swap transactions relating to Greece.1 02
The EU sovereign debt crisis illustrates that, whereas national
governments are tempted to act to protect domestic interests in times of
crisis, the EU's Member States are interdependent rather than
independent.103 The states within the eurozone are clearly connected by a
single currency, but EU states outside the eurozone are also bound by their

9

See, e.g., Marsh, supra note 29.

See, e.g., Peter Praet, Member of the Exec. Bd. of the ECB, Speech at the International Center
for Monetary and Banking Studies: Monetary Policy at Crisis Times (Feb. 20, 2012), transcript
availableat http://www.ecb.int/presslkey/date/2012/html/spl20220.en.html.
96

See, e.g., ECB, ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at 138 (2011) ("[Cjoncerns about the interplay between
sovereign debt problems and banking sector vulnerabilities in some euro area countries
reemerged in the second half of the year.").
97

9 See, e.g., Peter Eavis, Greek Crisis Raises New Fears over Credit-Default Swaps, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 21, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/greek-crisis-raises-new-fears-over-creditdefault-swaps/?src=me&ref=business.
99 See, e.g., Hannoun, supranote 17.
1ooSee Council Regulation 513/2011, supra note 83.
101See, e.g., Matina Stevis & Katy Burne, Greek Legal Maneuvers Raise Fearsof Euro-Zone Debt
Fallout, WALL ST. J.: THE EuRo CRISIS (Feb. 23, 2012, 4:54 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/eurocrisis/
20 12/02/23/greek-legal-maneuvers-raise-fears-of-euro-zone-debt-fallout/.
Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n [ISDA], Determinations Committee Decision: Has a
Restructuring Credit-Event Occurred with Respect to The Hellenic Republic?, at 5, Issue Number
2012030901 (Mar. 9, 2012).
102

1os

See, e.g., Sefiovi6, supra note 67.
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links with the other EU Member States. The Member States are required
under Article 121 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
("TFEU") to "regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern,"
and they are required to avoid excessive deficits under Article 126 TFEU. 104
States in the eurozone are subject to greater constraints. In the past, these
constraints have often seemed more theoretical than real, which has been
recognized for some time as an essential weakness of economic and monetary
union in the EU.105 The EU has now been forced to reinforce its economic
governance,10 6 although it is not clear that the new controls will be sufficient
to resolve the crisis. The reinforcement of economic governance involves
measures which are being implemented via the Community Method, and new
treaties.
In November 2011, the EU agreed on a reinforced Stability and Growth
Pact, known as the six-pack because it comprises five regulations and a
directive, which entered into force the following December.107 The
Commission proposed an additional two-pack in November 2011,108 and also
published a Green Paper proposing that the members of the eurozone be
empowered to issue Stability Bonds. 109 But joint issuance of bonds by
members of the eurozone would require strong fiscal discipline. 110 The EU
and the eurozone are working on developing stronger fiscal discipline through
a treaty among the eurozone members on the European Stability
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 126, Sept.
5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
104

105See, e.g., SCHUKNECHT ET AL., supra note 30.

See, e.g., Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Commission Proposes to Suspend C495 Million of
Cohesion Fund for Hungary for 2013 for Failure to Address Excessive Deficit (Feb. 22, 2012),
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-12-161_en.htm.
106

See, e.g., Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, EU Economic Governance "Six-pack" Enters into Force
(Dec. 12, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO-11-898_en.htm. See also
Council Regulation 1173/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 1; Council Regulation 1174/2011, 2011 O.J. (L
306) 8; Council Regulation 1175/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 2; Council Regulation 1176/2011, 2011
O.J. (L 306) 25; Council Regulation 1177/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 33; Council Directive
2011/85/EU, art. 126(14), 2011 O.J. (L 306) 41.
107

10 Commission Proposalfor a Regulation on Common Provisions for Monitoring and Assessing
Draft Budgetary Plans and Ensuring the Correctionof Excessive Deficit of the Member States in
the Euro Area, COM (2011) 821 final (Nov. 23, 2011); see Commission Proposal for a Regulation
on the Strengthening of Economic and Budgetary Surveillance of Member States Experiencing or
Threatened with Serious Difficulties with Respect to Their FinancialStability in the Euro Area,
COM (2011) 819 final (Nov. 23, 2011).

iOiSee Commission Green Paper on the Feasibility of Introducing Stability Bonds, COM (2011)
818 final (Nov. 23, 2011).
110 See, e.g., Stijn Claessens et al., Paths to Eurobonds 6 (IMF, IMF Working Paper No.

WP/12/172, 2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wpl2l72.pdf ("[T]he
possibility of transfers raises questions about moral hazard and the viability of any common debt
proposal crucially depends on the ability to reduce and control it. The stronger the safety net and
the larger the transfers, the greater is the concern that some countries may free ride. Common
debt issuance thus requires powerful mechanisms to enforce fiscal discipline in a time-consistent
manner.").
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Mechanism,111 and a treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the
Economic and Monetary Union, 112 to which all EU Member States except the
United Kingdom and the Czech Republic are parties. 113 As a matter of formal
legal rules, EU Member States face new levels of control of their domestic
economic management. But the EU's history demonstrates that strong rules
are not enough: enforcement of the rules is also crucial.
The EU's sovereign debt crisis raises particular issues with respect to
financial stability within the eurozone. But financial stability has also
developed more generally as a significant issue in financial regulatory policy
at the international level, within the EU, and in the governments of the EU
Member States because of the financial crisis. The Financial Stability Forum,
which was established a decade earlier to address issues of financial stability,
became the Financial Stability Board. 114 At the domestic level, governments
began to build a concern for financial stability into financial regulation.115
The EU established a European Systemic Risk Board ("ESRB"),116 which was
to be chaired by the President of the ECB for the first five years. 117 The

111Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, Feb. 2, 2012, available at
http://www.european-council.europa.eulmedia/582311/05-tesm2.enl2.pdf The Treaty is adopted
pursuant to Art 48(6) TEU, which "allows the European Council, acting by unanimity after
consulting the European Parliament, the Commission and, in certain cases, the [ECB], to adopt a
decision amending all or part of the provisions of Part Three of the [TFEU]." Council Decision
2011/199, 2011 O.J. (L 91) 1. The Decision was scheduled to come into force on January 1, 2013,
if ratified by the Member States. Id. art. 2.
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, Jan.
31, 2012, availableat http://www.european-council.europa.eulmedia/579087/treaty.pdf.
112

113 See, e.g., EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, THE EURO AREA CRISIS, 2010-12, H.L. 260, at 5

(U.K.) ("The proposed 'fiscal compact' and economic policy coordination measures for the euro
area have been highly controversial. In December 2011 the United Kingdom indicated it would
stand aside, and at the end of January 2012 the Czech Republic stated that it would not
participate for the time being. Eight of the ten non-euro Member States are likely to join the 17
euro area states in signing the new treaty at the next European Council on 1-2 March 2012. The
proposed treaty makes clear that the key provisions apply only to euro area states (unless a noneuro state indicates that it will choose to be bound by them).").
See, e.g., Enrique R. Carrasco, The Global FinancialCrisis and the FinancialStability Forum:
The Awakening and Transformation of an International Body, 19 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 203 (2010).
114

us HM TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATION: BUILDING A STRONGER SYSTEM,

2011, Cm. 8012, at 4 (U.K.) ("[A] new Financial Policy Committee (FPC) will be established in
the Bank of England, with responsibility for 'macro-prudential' regulation, or regulation of
stability and resilience of the financial system as a whole.").
Council Regulation 1092/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 1 [hereinafter ESRB Regulation]; see also
EUR. SYSTEMATIC RISK BD. [ESRB], http://www.esrb.europa.eu/home/html/index.en.html (last
visited Mar. 16, 2013).
116

ESRB Regulation, supra note 116, art. 5; see also Council Regulation 1096/2010, art. 1, 2010
O.J. (L 331) 162. Willem Buiter, commenting on the proposal for the ESRB, wrote that it was
"ludicrously lopsided in favour of central banks in general and of the ECB in particular." Willem
Buiter, The Proposed European Systemic Risk Board Is Overweight Central Bankers, WILLEM
BUITER'S MAVERECON (Oct. 28, 2009, 12:34 AM), http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2009/10/theproposed-european-systemic-risk-board-is-overweight-central-bankers/#axzzlnAN1lhkg.
1I
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Regulation establishing the ESRB made clear that the ESRB was to
cooperate with the IMF and FSB118 and also had responsibility for issuing
warnings and recommendations to the EU, to individual Member States, and
to the European Supervisory Authorities and national regulators. 119 The
ESRB was to function in part as a mechanism for implementing international
financial stability standards in the EU. The ESRB has published
recommendations on how the Member States should define the objective of
macro-prudential policy, on institutional arrangements for the Member
States' measures with respect to financial stability, and on the need for
transparency and accountability. 120 The ESRB emphasized that the national
authorities responsible for macro-prudential policy should be "as a minimum
operationally independent, in particular from political bodies and from the
financial industry."l21 The ESRB's model of how to address financial stability
is clearly a technocratic model, based on expertise, and insulated from
politics. The ESRB has also issued recommendations on foreign currency
lending, 122 and on U.S. dollar denominated funding of credit institutions.1 23
Within the EU's legal system, recommendations are not binding, so the
effectiveness of the ESRB's work depends on the Member States' willingness
to give effect to the recommendations.1 24 In addition to generating non-

us ESRB Regulation, supra note 116, T (7) ("The ESRB should draw expertise from a high-level
scientific committee and take on all the global responsibilities required in order to ensure that
the voice of the Union is heard on issues relating to financial stability, in particular by
cooperating closely with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Financial Stability
Board (FSB), which are expected to provide early warnings of macro-prudential risks at the
global level, and the partners of the Group of Twenty (G-20).").
119 Id. T (17) ("The ESRB should issue warnings and, where it deems necessary,
recommendations either of a general or a specific nature, which should be addressed in
particular to the Union as a whole or to one or more Member States, or to one or more of the
ESAs, or to one or more of the national supervisory authorities with a specified timeline for the
relevant policy response.").
120 Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board on the Macro-PrudentialMandate
of
National Authorities, 2012 O.J. (C 41) 1, available at http://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/
recommendations/2011/ESRB_2011_3.en.pdf.

121 Id.

at Recommendation E.

Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board of 21 September 2011 on Lending in
Foreign Currencies, 2011 O.J. (C 342) 1, available at http://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/
recommendations/2011/ESRB_2011_1.en.pdf.
122

123 See Recommendation of the EuropeanSystemic Risk Board of 22 December 2011 on
US Dollar
Denominated Funding of Credit Institutions, 2012 O.J. (C 72) 1, available at
http://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/ESRBRecommendationonUSDFunding.pdf.

Jean-Claude Trichet wrote that "[tihe establishment of the European Systemic Risk Board
(ESRB) on 16 December 2010 marked a major milestone in terms of Europe learning lessons
from the crisis." ECB, ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 97, at 11. It may be difficult for
addressees to ignore its recommendations and warnings. Frank Dierick et al., The ESRB at Work
124

- Its Role, Organisationand Functioning,in MACRO-PRUDENTIAL COMMENTARIES, at 4 (ESRB,

Macro-prudential Commentaries, No. 1, 2012), available at http://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/
commentaries/ESRBcommentary 1202.pdf ("[T]he process leading to the adoption of warnings
and recommendations and their communication involves collective consideration by a set of
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binding recommendations, the ESRB contributes comments to consultations
on financial regulatory policy initiated by the Commissionl 25 and thus may
have an impact on the development of binding rules.
During the crises, the ECB has been actively providing European banks
with liquidity support under its LTRO program. 126 After Mario Draghi took
over at the ECB, the ECB extended the period for which support is available
and relaxed the conditions for collateral eligibility. The aim of the program is
to provide funding for banks while they are unable to raise funds through
normal market channels with the hope that at some point they will be able to
return to the markets for funding. But some commentators worry about
whether banks will become too reliant on this source of funding and whether
banks which received money in the LTRO program have invested the funds
in high interest (and risky) sovereign debt.127 Banks which invested LTRO
funds in sovereign debt were not lending money to businesses1 28 and not
encouraging economic growth. Reliance on funding from the ECB provides a
temporary solution to support banks in difficulty. Weaning banks off this
support will be difficult, but necessary.1 29
The ECB characterized its role as a central bank as including a need to
monitor financial system stability before the recent crises,1 30 and the ECB is
a member of the FSB. The ECB has the right under the TFEU to be consulted
with respect to EU measures in its field of competence and also on draft
national measures which relate to its competence.131 This means that the
important bodies and institutions, which makes it difficult for the addressees to simply ignore
them.").
125 See, e.g., ESRB, THE ESRB's REPLY TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S GREEN PAPER ON

SHADOW BANKING (2012), available at http://www.esrb.europa.eu/shared/pdf/2012-05-30_ESRB
..reply.pdf.
126 See, e.g., LTRO: A User's Manual, supra note 25.
See Mary Watkins et al., Forecast Demand for ECB Loans Scaled Back, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 24,
2012, at 33.
127

See, e.g., Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, Address at the Day in Memory of Federico
Caff&, Sapienza Univ., Rome: A Route for Europe (May 24, 2012), transcript available at
have
operations
("Such
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2012fhtml/spl20524 1.en.html
reinforced the perverse link between banks and sovereign debtors and may be considered a
violation of the prohibition of financing public debt with central bank money, laid down in Article
123 of the Treaty. And, the opposite-but conceptually equivalent-criticism that these
operations did not provide the economy with finance.").
128

129 See, e.g., BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, 82ND ANNUAL REPORT: 1 APRIL 2011-31 MARCH 2012,
at x (2012) ('The long-term objective of policy must be to pave the way to a robust business model
of banking featuring strong and transparent balance sheets, self-sustaining international
operations, and stable profits that do not rely on official support.").

130 See, e.g., ECB, EU BANKING SECTOR STABILITY (2003), availableat http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdfl
other/eubksectorstability2003en.pdf.
131Article 127(4) TFEU provides:
The European Central Bank shall be consulted: on any proposed Union act in
its fields of competence, by national authorities regarding any draft
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ECB expresses its opinions on a wide range of domestic and EU-level
measures which relate to the financial system. The ECB's role in these
2
consultations is an advisory one. In practice the other EU institutions3 and
the Member States may not consult the ECB sufficiently far in advance for
the consultation to be effective. 133 But the ECB iterates and reiterates its
preoccupations in its opinions on EU and national measures. For example,
the ECB emphasizes that responses to the crisis should be collective rather
than unilateral. 134 Opinions of the ECB cite with approval proposed measures
135
that are consistent with views the ECB had expressed on earlier proposals.
The ECB has a range of powers, from the hard coercive powers it enjoys
in the context of coordinating financial support with sovereign debtors to
legislative provision in its fields of competence, but within the limits and
under the conditions set out by the Council in accordance with the procedure
laid down in Article 129(4). The European Central Bank may submit opinions
to the appropriate Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies or to
national authorities on matters in its fields of competence.
TFEU, supra note 104, art. 127(4). Article 282(5) provides that "[w]ithin the areas falling within
its responsibilities, the European Central Bank shall be consulted on all proposed Union acts,
and all proposals for regulation at national level, and may give an opinion." Id. art. 282.5; see
also Council Decision 98/415, 1998 O.J. (L 189) 42 (EC).
See, e.g., Opinion of the European Central Bank on a Proposalfor a Directive on the Access to
the Activity of Credit Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit Institutions and
Investment Firms and a Proposal for a Regulation on Prudential Requirements for Credit
3, available at
1,
105)
O.J. (C
Institutions and Investment Firms, 2012
http://www.ecb.intlecb/legal/pdf/c_10520120411en00010036.pdf ("[I]n order to deploy the full
benefits of the exercise by the ECB of its advisory role, the ECB should be consulted in due time
on any draft Union acts, including draft delegated and implementing acts, falling within its
fields of competence.").
132

133 See,

e.g., Opinion of the European Central Bank of 20 February 2012 on State Guarantees, at
2, CON/2012/13 (Feb. 20, 2012), available at http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en con_2012-13.pdf
(noting that "[t]he consultation request was submitted on 27 January, and the consulting
authority requested the ECB to consider the consultation as a matter of urgency, without
however setting a time limit. On 1 February, without further notice, the draft order was adopted
and published in the Boletin Oficial del Estado including an annex on the fee structure that had
not been included in the draft text submitted to the ECB. In this context, the ECB would like to
remind the Spanish authorities that, according to Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC, the ECB must
be consulted at an appropriate stage enabling the authority initiating the draft legislative
provision to take into consideration the ECB's opinion before taking its decision on the
substance. Furthermore, it should be ensured that the ECB is able to perform its advisory role in
an appropriate manner by making available the full draft text to it").
134 See, e.g., Opinion of the European Central Bank of 24 January 2012 on Measures for the

Stabilisation of the Financial Market, at 3, CON/2012/2 (Jan. 24, 2012), available at
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en-con_2012_2_f-sign.pdf ("In line with its previous
opinions, the ECB emphasises that when adopting measures to deal with the financial crisis,
Member States should act in a coordinated manner.").
135 See, e.g., Opinion of the European Central Bank of 12 December 2011 on the Establishment

and Financing of a Resolution Fund and on the Amended Calculation of Contributions to the
available at
CON/2011/103 (Dec. 12, 2011),
Deposit Guarantee Scheme, at 4,
http://www.ecb.intlecb/legal/pdf/en-con 2011_103 f sign.pdf ("In addition, the ECB welcomes
that the draft law and the draft royal decrees accommodate several recommendations in previous
ECB opinions on resolutions funds.").
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softer powers in the context of its participation in transnational work on
financial stability and consultation on EU and Member State initiatives. By
2012, the ECB was a much more visible entity than it was before the crises.
In the summer of 2012, Herman van Rompuy proposed that the ECB should
become a banking regulator. 136 The IMF called for the EU to establish
banking and fiscal unions at that time.13 7
IV.

IMAGINING THE EU's FUTURE

During the two recent crises, the management of financial regulation,
financial stability, and economic governance has evolved: there are new, more
detailed rules, and EU agencies, such as the ECB, ESMA, and the EBA, have
new roles and new powers. Reactions to the crises have involved a
combination of technical and political responses, and new examples of the
incremental nature of EU policy making. The terms on which the Member
States collaborate are again subject to negotiation and renegotiation (a new
illustration of the dialectic between nation-states and the community referred
to at the beginning of this Article). Because the negotiations are ongoing, as
of the fall of 2012, it is unclear what EU financial regulation and economic
governance will look like in the future. There are more questions than
answers. This section of the Article focuses on some of these questions.
A significant part of the problems the EU faces relates to the linkages
between financial institutions and the sovereign states in whose debt they
have invested, and where they are based. The financial markets have lost
confidence in banks and in many eurozone sovereign debtors. The crises
illustrate the enormous power the financial markets can exert over members
of a monetary union. 1 38 The EU has sought to control the exercise of this
power by limiting the ability of financial market participants to bet against
sovereign debt.139 The EU also sought to increase the confidence of the
financial markets in the eurozone by signing both the Fiscal Stability Treaty
136
137

Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, supra note 13.
IMF, IMF

CONSULTATION

COUNTRY REPORT No. 12/181, EURO AREA POLICIES: 2012 ARTICLE IV
10 (2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/crl2181.pdf

("Only a convincing and concerted move toward a more complete EMU could arrest the decline in
confidence engulfing the region. A credible roadmap toward a full banking union and fiscal
integration will make the short-term crisis measures more effective. Structural reforms
throughout the euro area will also be necessary to revive growth in the long run, while
macroeconomic policies can smooth the needed adjustment in the short run.").
13s See, e.g., Paul De Grauwe, A FragileEurozone in Search of a Better Governance, 43 ECON. &

Soc. REV. 1, 4 (2012) ("[lIn a monetary union, financial markets acquire tremendous power and
can force any member country on its knees."). De Grauwe notes that, in 2011, U.K. government
debt was a higher proportion of GDP than Spanish government debt, yet the financial markets
assessed Spain's risk of default as higher than that of the United Kingdom. Id. at 2.
See, e.g., Council Regulation 236/2012, supra note 84, at 1, 1 22 ("Since entering into a
sovereign credit default swap without underlying exposure to the risk of a decline in the value of
the sovereign debt could have an adverse impact on the stability of sovereign debt markets,
natural or legal persons should be prohibited from entering into such uncovered credit default
swap positions.").
139
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and the ESM Treaty, but progress on ratification was slow. The German
Constitutional Court was invited to consider whether the ESM Treaty is
compatible with the German Constitution, 140 and declined to issue
injunctions preventing the German President from signing the treaty. 141 An
Irish referendum approved the Fiscal Stability Treaty, 142 but the Irish
government decided not to hold a referendum on the ESM Treaty. 143 Thomas
Pringle, an Irish citizen and a member of Ddil tireann, one of the Houses of
the Oireachtas, the Irish national parliament, challenged the ESM Treaty in
the Irish Courts. The Irish Supreme Court opined that the Treaty did not
"involve a transfer of sovereignty so as to make it incompatible with the
Constitution" and made a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice on
questions relating to the validity of the ESM Treaty under EU law. 144 The
Court of Justice agreed to hear the case promptly and held a hearing in
October 2012,145 but the delay does not help to reassure the financial
markets. 146 Litigation about whether acts of the EU and its Member States
are consistent with EU law is frequent and consistent with protecting the
democratic legitimacy of the EU. The need to seek citizen approval for
changes to the EU's rules and to wait for the Court of Justice to decide on the
legality of rule changes makes it harder for the EU to respond to the crisis. At
the same time, the EU's legitimacy depends on developing, rather than
constraining, democracy and adhering to the rule of law. Even with the new
treaties in place, it is not clear whether the EU will be able to overcome the
political difficulties which impeded effective economic governance in the past.
The treaties do, however, signal a renewed commitment to improving
economic governance.
The EU's next steps involve negotiation of the details of a European
Banking Union involving banking supervision by the ECB. Moves to ensure
that regulators consider issues of financial stability have meant that central
Quentin Peel & Jamie Smyth, German Lawsuit Challenges Rescue Fund, FIN. TIMES, Aug.
13,
2012, http://www.ft.comlintl/cms/s/O/fda2f444-e562-11el-9a2f-00144feab49a.html.
140

Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 12, 2012, BVERFGE
1390, 2012 (Ger.).
141

142 Eamon Gilmore, Ireland'sFiscal Stability Referendum: A Yes for Recovery, GUARDIAN,
June 1,
2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/jun/01/ireland-referendum-yes-recovery.
143 European Stability Mechanism (ESM) Treaty: Fiscal Compact's Equally Obnoxious Brother,
PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT,
http://www.irishreferendum.org/p/european-stability-mechanism-esmtreaty.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
144

Pringle v. Govt of Ir., [2012] I.E.S.C. 47 (Ir.).

Press Release, Thomas Pringle TD, Pringle Welcomes CJEU Court Date (Aug. 15, 2012),
available at http://www.thomaspringle.ie/?p=1058.
145

Interview with Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of Fr. and Chairman of the Bd. of Dirs.
of the
Bank
for
Int'l Settlements
(Aug. 9,
2012), transcript available at
http://www.bis.org/review/rl20820a.pdf ("Markets would like to have everything settled within
five minutes. But there are 17 democracies in the euro area and 27 democracies in the European
Union. The time perspective of the markets is not that of democracies. Like Jean Monnet, I
believe that Europe will be forged in crises.").
146
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banks have developed new powers with respect to financial regulation. Giving
more responsibilities for financial regulation to the ECB makes sense from
the perspective of financial stability, and it would also address the
connections between financial firms and sovereign debtors, which have
proved to be so problematic. But developing a system in which the ECB is
responsible for bank regulation, and that is also consistent with the single
market in financial services, will be complicated. 147 Harmonized bank
regulation in the EU was designed to open up domestic markets within the
Member States to banks based in other Member States. Bank regulation was
imagined as an enterprise distinct from monetary policy in the eurozone area.
But the opening up of domestic financial markets also increased the risk of
contagion within the EU and particularly within the eurozone.
Herman van Rompuy's proposal for the ECB to take on responsibility for
bank regulation (prepared in close cooperation with the Presidents of the
Commission, the Eurogroup, and the ECB) stated that:
The current architecture should evolve as soon as possible
towards a single European banking supervision system with a
European and a national level. The European level would
have ultimate responsibility. Such a system would ensure
that the supervision of banks in all EU Member States is
equally effective in reducing the probability of bank failures
and preventing the need for intervention by joint deposit
guarantees or resolution funds. To this end, the European
level would be given supervisory authority and pre-emptive
intervention powers applicable to all banks. Its direct
involvement would vary depending on the size and nature of
banks. The possibilities foreseen under Article 127(6) TFEU
regarding the conferral upon the European Central Bank of
powers of supervision over banks in the euro area would be
fully explored. 148
In addition, he proposed a "European deposit insurance scheme" and a
"European resolution scheme." 149 The report characterizes its proposals as "a
vision for the future of EMU governance" having to do with deeper economic
and monetary union. 150 But establishing a eurozone deposit insurance
scheme and European resolution scheme that would not apply to banks
outside the eurozone would draw new distinctions between eurozone and EU
147 Cf. Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, supra note 13, at 4 ("[Ain integrated
financial framework should cover all EU Member States, whilst allowing for specific
differentiations between euro and non-euro area Member States on certain parts of the new
framework that are preponderantly linked to the functioning of the monetary union and the
stability of the euro area rather than to the single market.").
148

Id. at 4.

149

See id. at 4, 5.

150

Id. at 3.
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banks. In this sense, it would seem impossible to develop a system of
eurozone bank regulation that did not interfere with the single market. An
IMF paper, endorsing the idea of a European Banking Union, suggests that
other Member States should be allowed to opt into the new system. 15 1 U.S.
banking regulation tends to focus on the ability of banks to exercise some
choice about the rules that apply to them. The U.S. system centralizes
responsibility for deposit insurance and bank resolution in the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation. However, banks can choose to be chartered
either by state banking regulators or as national banks. 152 The rules that
apply to banks have implications for their ability to compete with other banks
and financial institutions. Differences between the rules and supervisory
arrangements applying to eurozone and non-eurozone banks in the EU will
likewise have implications for competition between banks and financial
centers. The U.K. House of Lords European Union Committee established an
inquiry into the proposed changes and issued a call for evidence, noting that:
Although the Government have made clear that the UK will
not take part in the fundamental elements of a banking
union, the implications of these developments for the UK
cannot be ignored. The Government argue that the UK's nonparticipation should not and need not adversely affect
London's position as the leading financial centre in Europe,
nor undermine the single market. The strength of this
argument may soon be tested. 153
Developing the ECB's role as a bank supervisor in addition to its other
functions would require an increase in the ECB's financial and personnel
resources. The ECB would need to employ bank supervisors even if some of
the work of bank supervision were to continue to be done by national bank
regulators. The details of the arrangements for a banking union involve
demarcating the responsibilities of the ECB and national regulators and of
the ECB and EBA. Drawing these lines is likely to be complex.
Although the document proposing a banking union refers to banking
supervision, Article 127(6) TFEU "relates to the prudential supervision of
credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of
insurance undertakings," 1 54 implying that it may be possible to address

151 IMF, IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 12/182, EURO AREA POLICIES: 2012 ARTICLE IV
CONSULTATION-SELECTED ISSUES PAPER 15 (2012) ("The framework of the Banking Union

should allow other countries to opt-in.").

See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, NATIONAL
BANKS AND THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM (2003) (U.S.).
152

153 EUR. UNION COMM., HOUSE OF LORDS, INQUIRY INTO REFORM OF THE EU BANKING SECTOR:
CALL FOR EVIDENCE (2012) [hereinafter HOUSE OF LORDS, BANKING SECTOR INQUIRY], available

at
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-sub-com-a/BankingReform/
CFEBankingReform.pdf.
154

Article 127(6) TFEU provides:
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issues with respect to shadow banking.15 5 Including some supervision with
respect to shadow banks in the new EU rules seems appropriate from the
perspective of addressing systemic risk, although it would create larger
issues relating to competition than a narrower banking union and would
likely make it more difficult to achieve agreement. Since measures adopted
under Article 127(6) TFEU require unanimity in the Council, this would give
negotiating power to countries outside the eurozone, such as the U.K., which
currently hosts significant financial activity, as the above quote from the
House of Lords' call for evidence notes. 15 6
The eurozone particularly seems to need a banking union more than the
broader EU. It is the combination of crises facing the eurozone that prompted
the proposal to intensify harmonization of banking regulation in the first
place. However, the logic of the single market demands that single market
rules should be harmonized for the whole market, not just for one segment of
that market.
The European Council responded to the banking union proposal with a
request for more concrete proposals to be developed in consultation with
Member States and the European Parliament. 157 In particular, the European
1 55
Council noted that amendments to the EU Treaties might be necessary.
The original proposal had envisaged "wide consultation and participation" in
realizing its vision, and consultation and participation not just of bankers but
also of citizens. 15 9 In September 2012, the Commission published a more
detailed outline of how the EU might achieve a Banking Union, 160 described
as a "Roadmap," together with a proposed regulation amending the EBA

The Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with a special
legislative procedure, may unanimously, and after consulting the European
Parliament and the European Central Bank, confer specific tasks upon the
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential
supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the
exception of insurance undertakings.
TFEU, supra note 104, art. 127(6).
155 Cf. ECB, COMMISSION'S GREEN PAPER ON SHADOW BANKING: THE EUROSYSTEM'S REPLY 1

(July 5, 2012), available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdflother/commissionsgreenpaper
onshadowbankingeurosystemreplyen.pdf ("The ECB/Eurosystem is very interested on (sic)
shadow banking for its importance for the financial stability of the euro-area.").
156 HOUSE OF LORDS, BANKING SECTOR INQUIRY, supra note 153.
157 Council

Conclusions 76/12, supra note 13, at 3.

Id. ("They will examine what can be done within the current Treaties and which measures
would require Treaty change.").
15s

Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, supra note 13, at 3 ("Overall, closer EMU
integration will require a stronger democratic basis and broad support from citizens. For this
reason, it is essential that already the process towards realising this vision is based on wide
consultation and participation. Integration and legitimacy have to advance in parallel.").
159

160 A Roadmap Towards a Banking Union, COM (2012) 510 final (Sept. 12, 2012) [hereinafter
Roadmap].
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regulation to confer powers on the ECB,161 and a proposed regulation to
empower the ECB to exercise powers with respect to banking regulation.16 2
In the Roadmap, the Commission characterized the single market and the
European Banking Union as "mutually reinforcing processes." 163 For the
Commission, this means that all EU Member States will be subject to the
same rules with respect to deposit insurance and recovery and resolution.16 4
The EU will have a common supervisory culture,165 but Member States
outside the eurozone could choose to opt in to closer cooperation with the
ECB.166 National banking regulators in the eurozone are to remain
responsible for consumer protection, money laundering, and supervising
branches or activities of banks from non-European Economic Area
countries.167 The Roadmap states that the Commission eventually plans to
make proposals for a resolution regime for the banking union as "a natural
complement to the establishment of a single supervisory mechanism."168 The
proposed regulation to amend the existing EBA regulation contains detailed
proposals to adjust voting within the EBA to give sufficient, but not
excessive, voice to the ECB as a competent authority.169
Although the Commission has fleshed out some of the details of the
European Banking Union plan, the Roadmap recognizes that the Member
States have not yet reached agreement on significant components of the
single rulebook-in particular, the proposals for deposit insurance and
recovery and resolution-and acknowledges that there are still other missing
elements of the plan, such as the resolution regime for the banking union.
Under the new proposals, the ECB is responsible for authorizing banks and
161 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 Establishing a European Supervisory Authority
Banking Authority) as Regards its Interaction with Council Regulation (EU) No.../...
Specific Tasks on the European Central Bank Concerning Policies Relating to the
Supervisionof Credit Institutions,COM (2012) 512 final (Sept. 12, 2012).

Amending
(European
Conferring
Prudential

Proposal for a Council Regulation Conferring Specific Tasks on the European Central Bank
Concerning Policies Relating to the Prudential Supervision of Credit Institutions, COM (2012)
511 final (Sept. 12, 2012).
162

163

Roadmap, supra note 160, at 4.

164

Id.

at 5.

165

Id.

166

Id.

167

Id.

16s

Roadmap, supra note 160, at 9.

at 7.

COM (2012) 512 final, supra note 161, at 3-5 (noting that the ECB is to be a competent
authority, the Commission went on to observe that, "[i]f voting rights remain unchanged, it
cannot be ensured that decisions taken by simple majority will always represent the interests of
the Union as a whole. Voting arrangements need therefore to be adjusted in some specific cases
of simple majority to ensure that the integrity of the internal market remains preserved while
avoiding at the same time the risk of paralysing the EBA decision making. . . . Article 45 of the
EBA Regulation is therefore amended to ensure that the Management Board includes at least
two Member States which are not participating in the SSM").
169
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withdrawing authorizations. But agreement on a resolution regime is critical
for the successful implementation of a European Banking Union. In addition,
the ECB does not have expertise in banking supervision. 170 The Commission's
proposals suggest that the ECB should benefit from the expertise of national
regulators. 171 The elements of the European Banking Union are complex, and
the process of achieving it is clearly long and uncertain. However, the
European Banking Union is a new demonstration that whereas the EU's
decision making structures do not always allow for quick responses to
situations of crisis, crises may prompt reforms which might not otherwise be
considered.
V.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the EU is moving further towards a system of financial
regulation with EU-level agencies exercising supervision over an increasing
range of financial activity. ESMA supervises credit rating agencies, and the
ECB may supervise banks in the eurozone and, presumably, their
subsidiaries outside the eurozone.1 72 These developments are interesting not
just to observers of the EU but also to observers of financial regulation more
generally, and especially to those who are concerned about the ability of
regulators embedded in national jurisdictions to regulate financial activity
which easily crosses geographic boundaries. For academic commentators who
argue for the establishment of an international regulator of financial
activity, 173 the EU's actions and travails provide a useful case study. But it is
a case study with its own particular features which create some ambiguities.
In part because financial regulation is part of a larger picture of integration
in the EU than it is at the international level, the EU has been able to
achieve more harmonization, and more binding harmonization, than the
international community supports.
At the same time, the fact that the EU is a political as well as an
economic or regulatory organization means that achieving agreement on
further integration takes time and requires some action to achieve buy-in
from citizens. The EU's procedures for informing citizens and encouraging
them to participate in decision making may not go as far as some would
170COM (2012) 511 final, supra note 162, at 11 ('"The ECB should therefore have the task to
authorise credit institutions and should be responsible for the withdrawal of authorisations.").
171Id. at 14 ("National supervisors have important and long-established expertise in the
supervision of credit institutions within their territory and their economic, organisational and
cultural specificities. They have established a large body of dedicated and highly qualified staff
for these purposes. Therefore, in order to ensure high quality European supervision national
supervisors should assist the ECB in the preparation and implementation of any acts relating to
the exercise of the ECB supervisory tasks.").
See, e.g., Andrew Duff, What the EU Agreed Last Week, What it Did Not and What Happens
Next, EUOBSERVER.COM (July 3, 2012), http://euobserver.com/843/116855 (noting that "[tlhe
Czechs and Poles have initial worries about losing all control over their banks (which are
subsidiaries of eurozone banks)").
172

173See, e.g., Pan, supra note 5.
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like, 1 74 but the EU's procedures for consulting citizens are much more
advanced than those of standard-setters such as the Basel Committee. 7 5
Within the EU, there are many groups that are prepared to challenge the
idea that matters of financial regulation are purely technical issues that
experts must decide.176 Engaging citizens in the details of financial
regulation is a more complex matter.177 But whereas EU scholars sometimes
argue that output legitimacy (good policy) is as good as input legitimacy (good
processes for developing policy), 1 7 8 the costs of the crises show that financial
regulation has distributive implications. The costs that failures of financial
firms have imposed on European citizens have made it clear that financial
regulation in the EU is a political, rather than a technical, issue. 179 But the
costs of failing to resolve the EU's crises could be even greater.

For an assessment of the EU's transparency policies in the context of financial regulation, see
Caroline Bradley, Transparency and FinancialRegulation in the European Union: Crisis and
Complexity, 35 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1171 (2012).
174

175 Cf. Caroline Bradley, Consultation and Legitimacy in Transnational Standard-Setting, 20

MINN. J. INT'L L. 480 (2011).
176 For example, the European Federation of Financial Services Users has a number of members

from different EU Member States. See History, EUROFINuSE,
/index.php?id=74 (last visited Mar. 16, 2013).

http://www.eurofinuse.org

177 On the difficulties of engaging citizens in discussions of financial regulation, see Caroline

Bradley, Transparency Is the New Opacity: ConstructingFinancialRegulation After the Crisis, 1
Bus. L. BRIEF (AM. U.) 7 (2011-12).
178 See, e.g., Deirdre Curtin & Albert Jacob Meijer, Does Transparency Strengthen
Legitimacy?,

11 INFO. POLITY 109, 112 (2006) ("On the whole the legitimacy of the EU and its decisions has
tended to be focussed [sic] on the output side of the equation. . . rather than on the input side.").
179 Cf. FIN. SERV. CONSUMER PANEL, GETTING CONSUMERS A FAIR DEAL FROM REGULATORY

REFORM: BRIEFING ON THE FINANCIAL SERVICES BILL (2012) (U.K.), available at http://www.fscp.org.uk/publications/pdflfsb-briefing.pdf ("The Financial Services Consumer Panel represents
the interests of consumers by advising the Financial Services Authority (FSA) on policy. The
Consumer Panel believes that the recent economic crisis and the financial scandals of the last
decade have demonstrated beyond all doubt that consumers need to have a strong voice in the
regulatory system.").

